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Abstract: This study analyzes the effect of child care costs on the labor supply of mothers 
with preschool children in Germany using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(2002). Child care costs are estimated on the basis of a sample selection model. A structural 
household utility model, which is embedded in a detailed tax-benefit microsimulation 
model, is used for labor supply estimation. In contrast to a previous German study, I find 
significant effects of child care costs on mother’s labor supply. Compared to other countries 
such as the US, Canada or the UK, the effects are rather small, which can be explained by 
the fact that child care costs are already heavily subsidized in Germany.  
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The purpose of this study is to shed some light on the effect of child care costs on the labor 
supply decisions of women with preschool children in Germany. Since policy makers in 
Germany recently have been emphasizing the importance of child care policies (see, e.g. 
German Ministry of Families, Seniors, Women and Youth - BMFSFJ 2003), the findings of 
this study can contribute to the on-going policy debate. 
Compared to other countries, the child care policy in Germany is rather peculiar: On the 
one hand, child care facilities are highly subsidized, and the share of the costs that parents 
have to bear is rather small, lying between zero and thirty percent. On the other hand, 
availability of child care places is relatively limited compared to other European countries, 
especially in west Germany
1. In east Germany, where the labor force participation of 
women is traditionally higher than in the west, availability and utilization of child care is 
comparable to other countries, such as Finland or France.  
The policy debate in Germany is mostly about increasing the amount of child care 
facilities and to extend opening hours of existing institutions, not about reducing private 
costs. Although free preschool child care is still a political goal of the federal government, 
in these times of tight fiscal policies subsidies to child care facilities are currently reduced 
in many cities, which increases parents’ fees considerably.  
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of child care costs on labor supply of 
mothers is clear-cut: Since child care costs increase the mother’s reservation wage, child 
care costs imply a lower labor force participation of women with small children. This result 
has also been found in a large number of empirical studies for the US, Canada and the UK. 
No matter what methodological approach is being used, all studies find a negative impact 
of child care costs on labor force participation of mothers. For the case of Germany, there is 
so far only one study on the relationship between maternal employment and child care costs 
(Merkle 1994). Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 1987, 
Merkle does not find a significant effect of child care costs on maternal labor force 
participation. 
My study aims at analyzing the relationship between child care costs and employment 
behavior of mothers
2 in Germany on the basis of data from the most recent wave of the 
GSOEP (2002). I follow the approach most widely used in the literature and estimate child 
                                                 
1 In a brochure of the German Ministry of Families, Seniors, Women and Youth, it is stated that as far as 
availability of child care facilities for preschool children is concerned, west Germany has a “structural lag” of 
10 to 15 years compared to other European countries (BMFSFJ 2003). 
2 An explanatory note on the focus of the analysis, namely the mothers’ instead of the parents’ labor supply 
decisions might be appropriate: According to a study by Friedl and Kannicht (1997) about child care patterns 
in Germany, mothers still bear the major part of time and responsibility of education and care of children. 
  2care costs on the basis of a selection model. However, in contrast to most studies, which 
estimate labor force participation probits only, I will estimate mothers’ labor supply on the 
basis of a structural household utility model embedded in a detailed tax-benefit 
microsimulation model. Estimation technique is discrete choice which, in combination with 
the tax-benefit model, makes it possible to account for the highly non-linear budget 
constraints faced by German households due to the tax and benefit system. This approach 
allows me to identify effects of child care costs on labor force participation and working 
hours decision of mothers with preschool children.  
Labor supply effects of child care costs are usually measured by price of child care costs 
elasticities. I calculate these elasticities by simulating a one percent increase of the private 
child care costs. Further, I simulate two policy reforms, (i) a 25 percent increase in child 
private care costs and (ii) a 100 percent subsidy, which means setting all private costs at 
zero. 
In contrast to the previous German study by Merkle (1994), I do find a significant effect 
of child care costs on the labor supply of mothers. The labor supply elasticities with respect 
to a one percent increase in the hourly price of child care are small (participation declines 
by 0.01 - 0.03 precentage points and hours decline by 0.03 - 0.09 percent, varying by 
region) though significant. Increasing private child care costs by 25 percent would result in 
a decline of the labor force participation of mothers of 1 percentage point in west and 0.5 
percentage points in east Germany. Finally, if child care were free for all households, 
mothers’ labor force participation would rise by 3 percentage points in west and 1.5 
percentage points in east Germany. 
 
 
2  Institutional Background and Some Stylized Facts  
 
Patterns of availability and utilization of child care facilities differ significantly in east and 
west Germany. While in east Germany utilization of child care facilities is traditionally 
high, the share of preschool children in child care facilities in west Germany is among the 
lowest of all countries of the European Union (see tables 1 and 2). The difference in child 
care utilization between east and west Germany is particularly striking for children under 
the age of  three. In 1998, there were only 2.8 child care places available per hundred 
children under the age of three in west Germany – compared to the east, where there were 
36.3 places per hundred children of the same age group. For children between three and 
school age (usually six years), part-time care is available in all parts of Germany (86.8 
  3places for hundred children in the west, 111.8
3 in the east). Since 1996, parents even have a 
legal claim for part-time care for each child between 3 and 6. However, availability of full-
time care facilities is limited in most parts of western Germany (of all child care places for 
children in this age group, only 18.8 percent are full-time care places in west Germany; in 
east Germany, this percentage is as high as 97.7 percent).  
 
Table 1: Share of children attending child care facilities  
in countries of the European Union (in percent) 
 
  Children aged 0-3  Children aged 4-6 
Austria** 3  75 
Belgium* 27  95 
Denmark** 48  82 
Germany** 6  91 
Finland** 21 53 
France* 23  99 
Great Britain*  2  60 
Greece* 2  64 
Ireland* 2  55 
Italy*** 6  91 
Luxembourg*** 6  91 
Netherlands* 8  71 
Portugal* 12  48 
Spain* 2  84 
Sweden** 33 72 
  Source: BMUJF (Österreichisches Bundesministerium f. Umwelt, Jugend, und Famile) 1999. 
  * Data from the year 1993 
  ** Data from the year 1994 
  *** Data from the year 1991 
 
Table 2: Availability* of child care facilities in Germany by age group and region 
 
Age Group   Year  east Germany  west Germany 
1990 54.2  1.8 
1994 41.6  2.2  0 - 3 
1998 36.3  2.8 
      
1990 114.3  78.3 
1994 96.2  73.0  4 - 6 
1998 111.8  86.8 
        Source: DJI (Deutsches Jugendinstitut) 2002. 
       *Definition of availability according to DJI: Places in child care facilities per 100 children. 
 
 
Most carriers of child care facilities in Germany are either the communities themselves 
or private (mostly confessional) institutions that are highly subsidized by communities 
(according to the Statistisches Bundesamt, total subsidies of child care facilities were as 
                                                 
3 Due to the sharp decline in the fertility rate in east Germany after 1989/90, there is considerable excess 
supply of child care facilities in some regions (see DJI 2002). 
  4high as 10.4 billion Euro in 2001). All carriers, either public or private, can - within certain 
limits - decide autonomously about the fees they charge. There are regulations, however, 
which force child care facility carriers to charge fees according to the parents’ income. 
Further, costs also depend on the number of children from one family in the same facility 
(siblings’ reduction). On average, parents’ fees amount to between zero and 30 percent of 
the total costs of child care facilities (DJI 2002). As a comparison, in the US the share of 
total child care costs that has to be borne by the parents amounts to 70 percent (Blau 2003). 
  In the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
4, which is the databasis for this 
analysis, there are questions on the monthly expenses on child care for each child in the 
household. There is also information on utilization, type and hours of child care for each 
child per household. Expenses are reported for formal child care facilities and for paid 
nannies who look after the children on a regular basis. GSOEP data show that for children 
under the age of three, parents pay about 70 € per month for part-time care in the east and 
about 110 € in the west. For full time care, average monthly fees lie between 100 and 220 
€. For children above three years, child care is much cheaper: for this age group, parents 
pay about 65 € on average for part-time care and about 100 € for full-time care.  
 
Table 3: Average monthly child care expenses by child (in € per month) 
 
  Part-time care  Full-time care 
Age East  West  East West 
0-3 72  110  100  218 
4 - 6  55  67  88  103 
  Source: GSOEP, wave 2002. 
 
Traditionally,  the link between mothers’ employment and the use of child care (at least 
part-time care for pre-schoolers) is not very strong in west Germany. According to the 
GSOEP, in west Germany about 50% of all children in part-time care facilities have 
mothers who are not employed and are not engaged in education or training (see table 4). 
Part-time care is seen as preschool education and not so much as a means to provide the 
possibilities for mothers to work. Further, since part-time care facilities do not provide 
enough hours of care, mothers often have to rely on informal child care arrangements 
(either relying on paid babysitters or unpaid care by relatives) even to be able to take up a 
part-time job. (For utilization patterns of informal, unpaid care arrangements see table 5.) 
Because of these (west) German institutional peculiarities, in particular the combination of 
limited availability of child care facilities and the low price of child care, it has been argued 
that it is not so much the costs of child care but the availability that influences mothers’ 
                                                 
4 For detailed information of the German Socio-Economic Panel see (Haisken-DeNew and Frick 2001). 
  5employment behavior (e.g. Kreyenfeld and Hank 1999, Spieß and Büchel 2003). German 
studies on the impact of availability of child care facilities on maternal employment report 
differing results. While Kreyenfeld and Hank (1999) do not find a significant effect of 
availability of child care on maternal employment, the study by Spieß and Büchel (2003) 
shows that there is a significant effect for mothers with children aged three to six in west 
Germany. 
 
Table 4: Employment status of mother and age of child / “child care status” of child, 
by age group and region (in percent) 
 
  Age of child 0 - 3  Age of child 4 - 6 
 East  West  East  West 
Full-time employment  24  8  30  10 
Part-time employment  17  18  26  30 
Marginal employment  5  11  3  10 
Education/Training 2  0  2  1 
Not employed  53  66  38  49 
Sum 100  100  100  100 
 
       
  Child not in child care facility Child in part-time care  Child in full-time care
 East  West  East  West  East  West 
Full-time employment  8  4  20  7  41  25 
Part-time employment  3  14  23  32  30  38 
Marginal employment  3  11  7  11  2  7 
Education/Training 0  0  5  0  1  2 
Not employed  86  71  45  50  25  28 
Sum 100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: GSOEP, wave 2002. 
 
Child care has many dimensions, such as quality, availability and costs. On top of the 
political agenda in Germany is an increase in availability of child care places. Also quality 
issues have been discussed recently, especially in the context of the poor performance of 
German pupils in the PISA study
5. Reducing the private costs of child care is not a primary 
political goal at the moment. Although the Federal Ministry of Families, Seniors, Women 
and Youth states that “free preschool child care must not be a distant prospect” (BMBFSFJ 
2003, p.18), the prevailing tendency is to increase parents’ fees to child care facilities. For 
example, the municipality of Berlin increased parents’ fees considerably in January 2004. 








5 The PISA (Programme for International Student Assesment) study is a survey of the knowledge and skills of 
15-year-olds in the principal industrialised countries undertaken by the OECD. 
6 For example, in the city of Marburg, parent’s fees have been increased by 25 percent in January 2004. In 
April 2004, parent’s fees will be increased by about 10 percent in the city of Wiesbaden. Also in Saxony an 
increase of parent’s fees is discussed. 
  6Table 5: Utilization of informal care arrangements by age of child / mother’s 
employment status (in percent) 
 
  Care by relatives*  Care by friends* 
Age of child  East  West  East  West 
0 – 3  40  30  6  5 
4 – 6  44  35  9  9 
 
Employment status of mother 
Full-time employment  47  44  4  13 
Part-time employment  46  45  14  11 
Marginal employment  80  34  10  6 
Education/Training 20  1  0  0 
Not employed  36  25  8  6 
Source: GSOEP, wave 2002. 
* Both categories possible. Question in the questionnaire: “Are there additionally (to the utilization of 
child care facilities and paid nannies) other persons outside the household who regularly watch or take 
care of your children?” Unfortunately, there is no information on hours and frequency of these care 




3 Literature  Review 
 
A large body of literature deals with the question of whether and how much child care costs 
influence mothers’ labor supply in various countries (for a detailed literature review see 
Anderson and Levine 1999, or Viitanen 2004a). The vast majority of the literature is about 
the US (see, among others Blau and Robins 1988, Connelly 1992, Ribar 1992 and 1995, 
Anderson and Levine 1999), Canada (see Cleveland et.al. 1996, or Powell 1997) and the 
UK (see, e.g., Viitanen 2004a). The different methodological approaches vary with respect 
to (i) the variation in the costs of child care and (ii) the modeling of labor supply. The 
variation in child care costs is either captured by the variation in prices of child care 
facilities by region or by making use of the differences in child care expenses across 
households. In the latter case, child care costs have to be predicted for households who are 
not using child care. This problem is similar to the one of prediction of wage rates for 
people who are not employed in a labor supply estimation. However, in the case of child 
care costs, the underlying selection problem is even more complicated than in the case of 
wages: Child care costs are only observed for households who use formal child care, and 
the decision of utilization of child care is strongly related to the mother’s employment 
decision. Therefore, the method used in most studies is to estimate a bivariate probit model 
on the probability of the mother being employed and the probability of the utilization of 
child care. On the basis of these probit models, inverse Mill’s ratios are calculated and used 
as regressors in an OLS regression on child care costs based on the selected sample only. 
The labor supply decision is modeled as a binary choice labor force participation estimation 
in most studies. There are a few studies that estimate a structural model (Ribar 1995, 
  7Michalopoulos et.al. 1992). In these cases, the parameters of a utility function (based on 
assumptions of functional forms) are estimated.
7  
No matter what methodology employed, all studies using data from North America and 
the UK find a negative impact of child care costs on maternal employment. However, the 
size of this effect varies widely: the reported employment elasticities of mothers with 
respect to a change in child care costs lie between just above zero and almost one. As 
Anderson and Levine (1999) point out in their literature review, the studies using structural 
models to estimate the effects report lower elasticities than the others.  
For Germany, the only study on the relationship between child care costs and maternal 
labor supply that employs a similar approach to the above-cited studies is by Merkle 
(1994). She uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from the year 1987, where 
monthly child care expenses were reported by households for each child. She estimates 
monthly child care prices using different specifications and various sample selection 
models. Labor supply is estimated by a probit model on participation status and by a 
bivariate probit on utilization of formal child care and participation status. Merkle does not 
find a significant effect of child care costs on the participation decision of mothers with 
children aged three to eight
8. She tries to explain this result with the peculiar child care 
situation in Germany, where opening hours of child care facilities are not long and flexible 
enough to meet the demands of working mothers. Therefore, she concludes that 
participation depends primarily on the availability of informal caregivers as a complement 
to the possibilities of formal child care, and not so much on the price of the latter. 
 
 
4  Econometric Methodology  
 
In this section, I will describe my approach of estimating labor supply of women and 
identifying the participation and hours elasticities with respect to changes in child care 
costs. After the description of the labor supply model I will outline the econometric 
methodology of estimating child care costs, taking into account some peculiarities of the 
German situation. Unfortunately, I can only evaluate the labor supply effects of mothers 
living in (married or unmarried) couples, since there are not enough observations of single 
mothers with preschool children. 
 
                                                 
7 In addition, there are some studies that analyze the effect of child care costs on mothers’ labor supply by 
evaluating the outcomes of “natural experiments” (see for example Viitanen 2004b). These studies employ a 
methodological approach that makes use of an exogenous policy shift affecting only one group of households.  
8 In one specification, Merkle does actually find a significant effect of child care costs on mother’s labor force 
participation, but the sign of coefficient is positive. 
  84.1 Specification of the Labor Supply Model 
 
Following the approach introduced by van Soest (1995), labor supply of women is modeled 
in the household context according to the household utility model. This model is based on 
the assumption that both spouses jointly maximize a utility function in the arguments of 
leisure of both spouses and net household income. Hours of work are assumed to be a 
categorical rather than a metric variable. This form of modeling takes into account the fact 
that hours of work are heavily concentrated at particular hours. The most important reason 
for this kind of modeling, however, is that the specification of a relatively small number of 
hours categories leads to a substantial reduction in computational burden, as the budget set 
of a household has to be computed for a few selected points only. Therefore, this 
simplification is in fact a prerequisite for an adequate specification of the budget constraints 
given the complexities of the German tax-benefit system. This is of special importance for 
the purpose of female labor supply, since the joint income taxation of married couples may 
result in high marginal tax rates for women from low working hours on, and therefore labor 
supply estimations that base on net wages only might lead to biased results. 
In the style of van Soest (1995) and Steiner (2000), I specify a household utility function 
depending on the leisure time of the household members and net household income. It is 
assumed that the household’s utility index for a particular hours category k can be modelled 
by the following translog function: 
 
(1)     k k k k k k x Ax x x U ε β + + = ' ' ) ( 
 
where x = (y, lm, lf)’. The components of x are the natural logs of net household income 
(y), leisure of the husband (lm) and leisure of the wife (lf). These components enter the 
utility function in linear, quadratic and cross terms. The matrix A, with elements αij, i,j = 
(1,2,3), contains the coefficient of the quadratic and the cross terms, the vector βj, j = 
(1,2,3), the coefficients of the linear terms. εk  is a stochastic error term accounting for 
unobserved factors that affect household utility, its distribution is specified below. 
Given the assumption of joint maximization of household utility, the household will 
choose hours category k if, in probability terms, the associated utility index, Uk, exceeds the 
utility index in any other possible alternative l, i.e.: 
 
(2)     () ( ) [] k l l l l k k k l k x Ax x x Ax x P U U P ε ε β β − > + − + = > ' ' ' ' ) (.  
 
  9Assuming that εk is distributed identically across all hours categories according to an 
extreme-value distribution
9, the difference of the utility index between any two hours 
categories follows a logistic distribution. Under this distributional assumption the 
probability of choosing alternative k relative to alternative l can be described by a 
Conditional Logit Model as introduced by McFadden (1973): 
 
(3)   , ,
) ' ' exp(
) ' ' exp(















where the summation sign is defined over all possible alternatives, i.e. hours categories. I 
control for observed heterogeneity by accounting for household characteristics such as age 
and health status of both spouses, number and age of children in the household, regional 
and nationality variables. Because variables with no variation across alternatives drop out 
of the estimation in the conditional logit model, the household-specific variables are 
interacted with household income and leisure times, which vary across hours categories.  
 
 
4.2 Data and Variables 
 
As already mentioned above, estimation of the labor supply model is based on data from 
the most recent wave (year 2002) of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The 
GSOEP is a representative sample of private households living in Germany with detailed 
information on household incomes, working hours and household structure. Although I am 
only interested in the labor supply behavior of households with children under the age of 
six years, I estimate the parameters of the utility function based on a sample of all 
households. However, I restrict the sample to heads of the households and spouses who are 
between 25 and 60 years old, who are not pensioners and not in any sort of schooling, 
training or university any more. Also self-employed people and civil servants are excluded, 




                                                 
9  The assumption that the error terms follow an extreme value distribution is rather restrictive and results in 
the property of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Random coefficient models, as opposed to the 
conditional logit model used here, allow for unobserved heterogeneity and therefore circumvent this ’IIA-
assumption’. However, Haan (2004), who estimated several labor supply models with the same data set I do, 
showed that the results (in terms of labor supply elasticities) from a random coefficient model do not differ 
significantly from the results obtained from a conditional logit model.  
10 Civil servants represent about 4 percent and self employed about 8 percent of the working population 
(GSOEP, wave 2002). 
  10Hours Categories 
 
In the GSOEP, information on the number of weekly hours actually worked (thus including 
overtime) in the month before the interview is given. The definition of the hours categories 
is motivated by both, economic considerations and the actual distribution of hours in the 
sample. Although a relatively fine aggregation of hours into categories seems desirable in 
order to realistically approximate the household’s budget constraint, the actual distribution 
of hours in the previously defined sample severely restricts the number of possible 
categories. In particular, men in the restricted sample typically do not work part-time and 
their actual working hours are heavily concentrated between 35 and 40 hours per week. 
However, for women I allow for six hours categories: non-employment, three part-time 
categories, full time and overtime
11. Table 6 shows the distribution of households across 
hours categories. 
The specification of the econometric model is based on the assumption that each 
household compares the expected utility obtained from net income and two spouses’ leisure 
associated with the choice of a particular hours category. Here, it is assumed that this 
comparison is based on the average number of hours worked in a particular hours category, 
where leisure is calculated by subtracting the working hours from an assumed total time 
budget of 80 hours per week. 
 
Table 6: Distribution of couple households among hours categories 
 
   Men 
Weekly Hours*  0  1-40 (37)  > 40 (48)  Sum 
0  200 (5.7)**  526 (14.9)  409 (11.6)  1135 (32.2) 
1-12 (8.5)  211 (6.0)  131 (3.7) 
13-20 (18)  239 (6.8)  159 (4.5) 
21-34 (27) 
88 (2.5) 
294 (8.3)  206 (5.8) 
1328 (37.6) 
35-40 (38.5)  490 (13.9)  250 (7.1) 
>40 (45) 
108 (3.1) 








Sum  396 (11.3)  1861 (52.8)  1280 (36.2)  3537  
 * Average of weekly working hours in parentheses. 
 ** Relative share in parentheses. 
 Source: GSOEP, wave 2002. 
 
 
Net Household Income 
 
Net household incomes for all hours categories are calculated by applying a detailed tax-
benefit simulation model, which contains the main features of the German tax, and transfer 
                                                 
11 As a sensitivity check, I have also run an estimation based on five hours categories for women, which did 
not lead to significantly differing results. 
  11system
12. The calculation of taxable income is based on information on earnings from 
dependent employment, income from capital, property rents and other income. For most 
households, earnings from dependent employment is the most important source of income. 
These earnings are calculated by multiplying gross hourly wages by the respective working 
hours in each hours category. For non-working individuals, wages are estimated by 
applying a two-stage estimation with a Heckman (1979) sample selection correction
13. 
Estimation results for the wage equations are available from the author upon request. 
Gross household income is calculated by adding all income components of all household 
members (weekly working hours are only varied by category for the head of the household 
and the spouse). Taxable income is calculated by deducting certain expenses from gross 
household income. The income tax is computed by applying the income tax formula to 
taxable income of each person in the household or of the spouses’ joint income, depending 
on marital status. Then, the income tax and employee’s social security contribution rates are 
deducted from gross income, and social transfers are added to get net household income. 
Social transfers include child benefits / child allowances, child-rearing benefits, education 
benefits for students (BAfoeG), unemployment compensation, housing benefits and social 
assistance.  
Child care costs also enter the model through the net household income variable. Hourly 
child care costs (in case of more than one child under six years: the sum of all hourly child 
care costs) are subtracted from the simulated net household income in each hours category 
according to the working hours of the mother. However, child care costs are not subtracted 
linearly increasing with working hours of the mother: I assume that less than part-time care 
(that is, a minimum of 3.5 hours per day) cannot be purchased for a child, thereby 
implementing a fixed costs part of child care costs. The measure of child care costs that are 
deducted from the simulated household income is described in the following section. 
At this stage, several assumptions that result from my approach of implementing child 
care costs in the labor supply model should be mentioned explicitly. First, it is assumed that 
all households purchase formal child care according to the mothers’ working hours, even if 
the father is not working. If the mother is not working, child care costs are set at zero, 
which is in line with an interpretation of child care costs as costs of employment; if a 
mother is not working, child care costs can be interpreted as consumption and should not be 
subtracted from the net household income. Another implication is that possibilities of free 
informal child care (e.g. by other relatives such as grandparents etc.) are not taken into 
                                                 
12 The same microsimulation model has already been used in, among others, Steiner 2000, Steiner and 
Wrohlich 2003 and 2004. A detailed description of the model can be obtained from the author upon request. 
13 In order to increase the variance of predicted wages to make it comparable to that of observed wages, I 
adjust the predicted wages by adding the normalized error term distribution of the regression of the observed 
wages.  
  12account. These assumptions imply that an extension of the mother’s working hours always 
lead to an increase in total child care costs. Finally, it is also assumed that every family can 
purchase desired hours of child care at the estimated price, implying that at the given price, 
there is no rationing in child care places. All these assumptions lead to an overestimation of 
the effects presented in section 5.2. 
 
4.3 Estimating Child Care Costs 
 
The information on child care expenses for child care facilities such as kindergartens or 
crèches and paid nannies are available in the GSOEP on a monthly basis. Further, there is 
information on whether the child is in a facility or cared for by a nanny part-time (with or 
without lunch) or full-time. To get an approximation for hourly child care costs, I divide the 
monthly expenses by 21.5 (average weekdays per month) and by 3.5 if the child is reported 
to be in part-time care without lunch, 5 if the child is in part-time care with lunch and 8 if 
the child is in full-time care.  
For the estimation of child care costs, I follow an approach widely used in the literature: 
Hourly child care costs are estimated on the basis of a regression model corrected for 
sample selection bias. The selection bias might appear because child care costs are only 
observed for households who use formal child care. Selection into this sample might not be 
completely random, since households using formal child care might have access to cheaper 
child care due to unobservable characteristics. Therefore, the regression of child care costs 
has to be corrected for this possible sample selection bias. It should be mentioned at this 
point, that most studies using North-American or UK data employ a double selection 
model. Most authors argue that child care costs are only observed for households where the 
mother is employed. Therefore, in addition to the selection regarding utilization, also the 
selection regarding employment of the mother should be controlled for. In Germany, 
however, the link between utilization and employment is not very strong, especially not for 
children between three and six years
14. Thus, for the case of Germany, I model the equation 
that determines selection into the sample of the children using formal child care as follows: 
 
(4)     i i i u W Z + ′ = γ    where  1 = i Z  if the child is in formal child care and 
          0 = i Z  otherwise. 
 
The subscript i represents a child, the vector Wi contains the explaining variables such as 
age of the child, number of siblings in different age groups, household income other than 
                                                 
14 As a control, I also run labor supply estimations including estimated child care costs based on a double 
selection model. The labor supply effects do not differ significantly.  
  13the mother’s wage income, the mother’s education and health status, other adult in 
household, other female adult, other unemployed adult, a dummy variable if the mother is 
not German and a set of regional variables. ui captures unobservable characteristics. The 
equation of interest, namely the hourly price of child care (Yi), is given in equation (5): 
 
(5)   i i i X Y ε β + = ' 
 
where Xi contains the determinants of the hourly child care price, including the age of the 
child, number of children in the household under the age of three, number of children per 
household between three and six years, net household income, mother’s years of schooling 
as well as regional variables. The sample rule says that Yi is only observed if Zi = 1. The 
error terms ui and εi follow a bivariate normal distribution with means 0 and covariance ρ. 
The expected value of hourly child care costs, given utilization of child care, is 
 
 (6)    [] [ ] i i i i i i i X W u Y E Z Y E 1 ' ' | 1 | λ β β γ λ + = − > = = ,   
 
where λ1i is the inverse Mill’s ratio, 
 












= ,    
 
φ(.) being the normal probability density function and Φ(.) the normal cumulative 
distribution function. Estimation could therefore be based on the two-step procedure 
introduced by Heckman (1979), where equation (4) is estimated by probit and equation (5) 
with OLS. The exclusion restrictions which identify equation (5) are number of siblings 
aged 6-10 and number of siblings aged 10-14, number of siblings older than 14, health 
status and of the mother, presence of another female adult in the household, presence of 
another unemployed adult in the household as well as a dummy if the mother is not 
German. These variables are assumed to influence the probability of utilization of formal 
child care but not the amount of the hourly costs of child care. 
Since a considerable share (about 10 percent) of households using formal child care do 
not have to pay for it, i.e. face zero costs, estimation of equation (5) with OLS might lead to 
negative predictions. Therefore, equation (5) will be estimated with a Tobit model. The 
expected value of Yi (hourly child care costs) has to be rewritten as: 
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Φ = ,  
where Xi contains the variables from equation (5) and the inverse Mill’s ratio λ1i from 
equation (7). σ is the standard error from the linear part of the likelihood function and λ2i  is 
the inverse Mill’s Ratio from the Tobit estimation, namely 
 

























2  . 
 
 
5 Estimation  Results 
 
In this section, I will first report the results from the child care costs estimation and then the 
results from the labor supply estimation, i.e. the labor supply elasticities with respect to a 
one percentage change of the gross wage rate and a one percentage change of the hourly 
cost of child care. Finally, I will also report the labor supply effects of rwo policy 
simulations. 
 
5.1 Results of the Child Care Cost Estimation 
 
Descriptive statistics of variables used for estimation can be found in table A1 in the 
appendix. Table 7 shows the results from the probit estimation of the selection model. 
Significant predictors of mother’s labor force participation are the age of the child, the 
number of children according to different age groups, presence of an unemployed adult 
(other than the mother) in the household, the mother’s years of schooling and the regional 
dummy variables. Since the Laender of east Germany (including Berlin) are the base 
category, the negative coefficients of the regional dummy variables indicate that in most 
Laender of the west, utilization of formal child care is lower than in the east. 
In the Tobit estimation of hourly child care costs, the number of children between 3 and 
6, net household income, the size of the city and some of the regional variables are 
significant predictors. The negative coefficient of the number of children between 3 and 6 
reflects the fact that most facilities give a discount when more than one child from the same 
household are in one facility. The positive sign of the coefficient of net household income 
  15indicates that the facilities charge fees depending on parents’ income
15. Also mother’s years 
of schooling have a positive significant effect of hourly child care expenses. This effect can 
be explained by the fact that better educated women tend to demand child care of higher 
quality. The selection correction term (lambda) is not significant. 
As outlined in section 4.2, the predicted values of hourly child care costs are multiplied 
by 21.5 (average workdays per month) and by daily working hours of the mother to get 
predicted monthly child care costs, which are then subtracted from net household income. 
Table 9 shows the average predicted and actual values of monthly child care costs over all 
households with children under 6, by hours category. 
 
Table 7: Results of the selection equation 
 
  Probability (Utilization=1) 
Variables Coefficient   Standard  Error 
age of child  0.7552 ** 0.04925 
# children <3  -0.2975 ** 0.1272 
# children 3-6  0.1538   0.1282 
# children 6-10  -0.3146 ** 0.1239 
# children 10-14  -0.3116 *  0.1696 
# children > 14  -0.0133   0.0910 
other income
g -0.0294 *  0.0162 
other female adult in hh  -0.3514   0.4496 
other unemployed adult in hh  -0.4013 *  0.2346 
age of mother  0.0206 *  0.0114 
mother’s years of schooling  0.0618 ** 0.0205 
mother not German  -0.0878   0.1286 
mother’s health status  -0.0046   0.0051 
size of city
ª 0.1090   0.0740 
region1 (“north-west”) 
ªª -1.3386 ** 0.4202 
region2 (“middle-west”) 
ªª -0.8058 ** 0.3858 
region3 (“south-west”) 
ªª -0.5043   0.3558 
region1*size 
ª, ªª -0.0114   0.0959 
region2*size
ª, ªª -0.8650   0.0916 
region3*size
ª, ªª -0.1561 *  0.0890 
constant -3.0376 ** 0.4884 
 
Number of observations: 1345 
Pseudo R² = 0.47 
                * indicates significance at 10% significance level 
                ** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
                        g  Other income
 was divided by thousand. 
                       ª  The variable size of city is a categorial variable that takes on values 1 to 7. 
 ªª  The regional dummy variables are defined as follows: Region1: Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, 
Niedersachsen and Bremen, Region2: Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz, Region4: 
Bayern and Baden-Württemberg, leaving all Laender of the former GDR and Berlin as base category. 
 
                                                 
15 I employed a Durbin-Hausman-Wu Test on endogeneity of the income variable. A simulated hypothetical 
income variable, where working hours are held constant over all households, was used as instrument. On the 
basis of this test, I could not find evidence for endogeneity of the income variable. 
  16Table 8: Results of the child care cost estimation (Tobit) 
 
Dependend variable: hourly expenditure on child care (per child) 
 
Variables Coefficient   Standard  Error 
age of child  -0.0468   0.0351 
# children under 3  -0.0656 *  0.0378 
# children 3-6  -0.2402 ** 0.0426 
mother’s years of schooling  0.0350 ** 0.0081 
net household income
g 0.0803 ** 0.0126 
size of city  -0.0419 *  0.0231 
region1 -0.5862 ** 0.1446 
region2 -0.0032   0.1208 
region3 -0.0041   0.1149 
region1*size -0.0129   0.0320 
region2*size 0.0731 ** 0.0299 
region3*size 0.0572 *  0.0316 
lambda -0.1235   0.1110 
constant 0.4815 *  0.2591 
 
sigma 0.5058    
 
Number of observations: 771 
64 left-censored at child care costs = 0, 707 unscensored 
Pseudo R² = 0.13 
    * indicates significance at 10% significance level 
       ** indicates significance at 5% significance level 
             g  Net household income
 was divided by thousand. 
 
 
Table 9: Average actual and predicted values of child care costs*  
by hours categories and region (in € per month)  
 
 East  West 
Hours  category  Actual Predicted Actual Predicted 
Couple Households 
0/0** 0  0 17  0 
0/19 38  55  29  83 
0/40 104  109  33  165 
37/0 0  0  36  0 
37/8.5 46  48  50  72 
37/18 47  55  76  83 
37/27 91  82  123  124 
37/38.5 106  109  107  166 
37/45 209  123  137  186 
47/0 0  0  40  0 
47/8.5 43  48  72  72 
47/18 72  55  71  83 
47/27 67  82  107  124 
47/38.5 125  109  194  166 
47/45 146  123  110  186 
 
          * Sum of all (monthly) child care costs for children under the age of six per household 
          ** First number refers to working hours of the father, second number to hours of the mother. 
 
 
  175.2 Results from the Structural Labor Supply Model 
 
The conditional logit labor supply estimation is based on the whole sample of couple 
households described in section 4.2. Estimation results in terms of coefficients of the 
household utility function are reported in table A2 in the appendix. The labor supply 
elasticities with respect to a one percent wage increase are within the range that is also 
reported by other studies (see Steiner 2000). According to my estimation, the participation 
rate of women in couple households would rise by 0.13 percentage points in the west and 
by 0.09 percentage points in the east. The hours elasticities with respect to a one percent 
change in the gross wage lie in the range between 0.21 and 0.38, depending on region. 
Looking at the group of women with preschool children, the labor supply elasticities lie 




Table 10: Labor supply elasticities with respect to  
a one percent increase in the wage rate 
 
  Women in Couple Households  
 East  West 
  Participation Elasticities (in percentage points) 
All women  0.09 
(0.06 – 0.11) 
0.13 
(0.11 – 0.16) 
Women with children up to 6  0.12 
(0.08 – 0.16) 
0.13 
(0.10 – 0.15) 
  Hours Elasticities (in percent) 
All women  0.21 
(0.14 – 0.27) 
0.38 
(0.31 – 0.44) 
Women with children up to 6  0.32 
(0.21 – 0.42) 
0.45 
(0.37 – 0.53) 
    Numbers in parentheses refer to bootstrap confidence intervals (100 repetitions). 
 
 
The impact of child care costs on mothers’ labor supply is usually captured in terms of 
price elasticities, i.e. the labor supply changes resulting from a one percent increase in the 
child care costs. Additionally, I also simulate a 25 percent increase in the private costs of 
child care and a hundred percent subsidy of child care costs. The results of these 
simulations are reported in table 11.  
The effects of a one percent increase are rather small, though significant: In case of a 
one percent increase in the hourly cost of child care, labor force participation of mothers 
with preschool children would decrease by 0.02 - 0.03 percentage points. Total working 
hours would decrease by 0.04 - 0.09 percent. Compared to results from studies on US, 
                                                 
16 It might be interesting to note that the labor supply elasticities obtained from the above-described 
household utility model do not differ significantly from the elasticities obtained by an estimation of the same 
model without taking into account child care costs (see Steiner and Wrohlich 2004). 
 
  18Canadian or UK data, which report participation elasticities in the range between -0.02 
(Ribar 1995) to -0.8 (Averett et.al. 1997), the results of my study are located at the lower 
end of the range. This is not surprising, since child care facilities are already highly 
subsidized in Germany and therefore the share of the costs that is borne privately is rather 
low (see section 2; Table A3 in the appendix shows the percent changes in income resulting 
from the different simulations). The reason why the labor supply effects  in east Germany 
are lower than in the west is due to the fact that both, labor supply elasticities (i.e. the 
reactions to any kind of income change) and the percent income change due to a rise in 
child care costs are lower in the east. 
 
Table 11: Labor supply elasticities with respect to changes  
in the hourly price of child care (women with children up to 6 only) 
 
1 % increase  
in child care costs 
25 % increase  
in child care costs 
100% subsidy  
to child care costs 
East West  East  West  East  West 
Participation Elasticities (in percentage points)* 
-0.02 
(-0.02 - -0.01) 
-0.03 






(0.98 – 2.04) 
2.80 
(2.31 – 3.28) 
Hours Elasticities (in percent)* 
-0.04 
(-0.05 - -0.02) 
-0.09 






(2.33 – 4.94) 
8.64 
(7.05 – 10.23)
 Numbers in parentheses refer to bootstrap confidence intervals (100 repetitions). 
 
 * Baselines:  
 Labor force participation of mothers with preschool children is 63% in east and 43% in west Germany. 
 Average weekly working hours of this group are 16.6 hours in east and 8.6 hours in west Germany. 
  
An increase in parents’ fees of 25 percent would lead to a decline in the participation 
rate of mothers by about 0.5 percentage points in east and about 1 percentage points in west 
Germany. Mothers’ working hours would be reduced by about 1 percent in east and by 
about 2 percent in west Germany. If one takes into account that some households might 
have the possibility to draw on free, informal child care arrangements, these effects might 
be overestimated. Still, when considering policies that increase parents’ fees to child care 
facilities, it is important to note that these policies significantly affect mothers’ employment 
decisions. 
In most of the international studies, reductions in child care costs rather than increases 
are simulated. Viitanen (2004a) reports an increase in the labor force participation by 25.4 
percentage points in case of a 100 percent subsidy of private child care costs. In a study 
using data for the US, Han and Waldfogel (2001) simulate a subsidy of 25 percent and 
report an increase in the labor force participation rate of married mothers with preschool 
children of 3 percentage points. Running a policy simulation of a hundred percent subsidy 
to child care costs for Germany, I find an increase in the participation rate of mothers with 
  19preschool children of about 3 percentage points in the west and about 1.5 percentage points 
in the east. Average weekly working hours would rise by about 4 percent in east and by 
about 9 percent in west Germany. These results show that the above cited political goal of 
providing free preschool child care would lead to a considerably higher labor force 
participation and longer working hours of mothers. 
 
 
6  Summary and Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to analyze the effect of child care costs on the labor supply of 
women with preschool children in Germany. Following the approach widely used in the 
international literature, I estimate child care costs on the basis of a selection model using 
data from the GSOEP, wave 2002. Labor supply is modeled on the basis of a structural 
household utility model. In contrast to the only previous German study on this subject 
(Merkle 1994), which uses data from 1987, I do find a relatively small, though significant 
effect of child care costs on mothers’ labor supply behavior. Participation elasticities with 
respect to a one percent increase in child care costs range between -0.02 (east) and -0.03 
(west) percentage points, while hours elasticities amount to between -0.04 (east) and -0.09 
(west) percent. The reason for the difference between the effects in east and west Germany 
is that both, labor supply elasticities of women and child care costs (also as percent of net 
household income) are higher in west Germany. In case that subsidies to child care facilities 
are cut and private child care costs increase by 25 percent, the participation rate of mothers 
would decrease by 1 percentage point (0.5 in the east) and working hours would decrease 
by 2 percent (1 percent in the east). A simulation of a policy reform of the opposite 
direction, namely providing a hundred percent subsidy of child care costs, shows that in this 
case, labor force participation of mothers would rise by about 3 percentage points (1.5 in 
the east) and average working hours would increase by 9 percent (4 percent in the east). 
Compared to results from studies from the US, Canada or the UK, which report 
participation elasticities from -0.02 (Ribar 1995) to -0.8 (Averett et.al. 1997), the price of 
child care elasticities of my study are located at the lower end of the range. The relatively 
small elasticities might essentially reflect the fact that, since child care facilities are already 
highly subsidized in Germany, the percentage change in household income due to a 
simulated change in child care costs is much lower than it might be the case in other 
countries. However, the effects are significant, and policies that lead to an increase in the 
private costs of child care do result in a lower labor force participation of mothers. 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
Used in the Estimation of Child Care Costs 
 
 
  Variable  Sample 
Mean 
Dependent variable in selection equation  in child care facility yes/no  0.59 
age of child (in years)  3.87 
# of children < 3  0.67 
# of children 3-6  0.83 
# of children 6-10  0.34 
# of children 10-14  0.18 
# of children > 14  2.11 
other income (in Euro per month)  2461 
other female adult in hh  0.02 
other unemployed adult in hh  0.06 
age of mother (in years)  33.78 
mother’s years of schooling  12.30 
mother not German  0.15 
mother’s health status***  0.77 
region 1*  0.17 
region 2*  0.39 
region 3*  0.31 
Exogenous variables in the selection 
equation  
 
Sample: all children up to the age of six 
years (sample size 1345) 
size of city**  3.91 
 
Dependent variable in Tobit model  hourly child care costs (in Euro)  0.76 
age of child (in years)  4.7 
# of children < 3  0.4 
# of children 3-6  1.1 
mother’s years of schooling  12.5 




Exogenous variables in the Tobit model  
 
Sample: all children up to the age of six 
years attending child care facilities  
(sample size 771) 
size of city**  3.91 
* The regional dummy variables are defined as follows: Region1: Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, 
Niedersachsen and Bremen, Region2: Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz, Region4: Bayern 
and Baden-Württemberg, leaving all Laender of the former GDR and Berlin as base category. 
** The variable size of city is a categorial variable that takes on values 1 to 7. 
*** Mother’s health status is defined as grade of disablement. 98% of all children’s mothers are not disabled, 
therefore for them the value of this variable is zero. 1 percent of all children have a value between 5 and 50, 









  23Table A2: Results of Conditional Logit Labor Supply Estimation, Couples 
 
Variable Coefficient   Standard  Error 
income 7.4575 ** 3.0379 
income squared  0.4118 ** 0.1771 
income*husband’s leisure  -1.8161 ** 0.2589 
income*wife’s leisure  -1.0749 ** 0.2461 
husband’s leisure  64.3626 ** 4.6140 
husband’s leisure squared  -4.5045 ** 0.2880 
wife’s leisure  103.3008 ** 6.1480 
wife’s leisure squared  -9.6803 ** 0.6022 
husband’s leisure*wife’s leisure  -2.2138 ** 0.3758 
husband’s leisure*dummy1  -0.9501 ** 0.3211 
wife’s leisure* dummy2  -0.3377   0.3235 
husband’s leisure*wife’s leisure*dummy3 0.1219   0.1152 
income*dummy3 1.0728   2.2914 
income squared*dummy3  -0.0140 ** 0.1795 
husband’s leisure*dummy4  -10.2645 ** 2.0862 
wife’s leisure*dummy4  -12.1814 ** 1.9537 
husband’s leisure*wife’s leisure*dummy4 2.4260 ** 0.5140 
income*dummy4 2.0155 *  1.0827 
income squared*dummy4  -0.2049 ** 0.0905 
husband’s leisure*husband’s age  -0.2863 ** 0.0592 
husband’s leisure squared*husband’s age squared  0.3982 ** 0.0656 
wife’s leisure*wife’s age  -0.5013 ** 0.0689 
wife’s leisure squared*wife’s age squared  0.7317 ** 0.0819 
husband’s leisure*husband’s health status  1.9939 ** 0.4537 
wife’s leisure*wife’s health status  2.4169 ** 0.6802 
wife’s leisure*dummy5  4.1890 ** 0.2300 
wife’s leisure*dummy6  2.5404 ** 0.1719 
wife’s leisure*dummy7  0.6680 ** 0.1707 
dummy8 -1.4176 ** 0.1402 
dummy9 -1.4877 ** 0.0712 
dummy10 -1.5780 ** 0.0858 
dummy11 -1.2804 ** 0.0862 
      
Number of observations: 52245  
(3483 households, thereof 504 with children under the age of six) 
Pseudo R² = 0.14 
      Dummy1: Husband is German 
      Dummy2: Wife is German 
      Dummy3: Head of household (person answering the GSOEP household questionnaire) is German 
      Dummy4: Household is living in east Germany 
      Dummy5: Children under the age of 6 in household 
      Dummy6: Children under the age of 16 in household 
      Dummy7: Children under the age of 17 in household 
      Dummy8: Part-time category: wife working 19 hours, husband working 0 hours 
      Dummy9: Part-time category: wife working 8.5 hours 
      Dummy10: Part-time category: wife working 18 hours 
      Dummy11: Part-time category: wife working 27 hours 
      * indicates significance at 10 % significance level 





  24Table A3: Percent change in simulated net household income  
 
  Percent change in net household income due to… 
… 1% increase in 
the mother’s wage 
…1% increase in the 
hourly price of child 
care 
… 25% increase in 
the hourly price of 
child care 
… 100% subsidy of 
child care costs  Hours 
category 
East West  East  West  East  West  East  West 
0/0* 0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
0/19 0.23  0.25  -0.03  -0.05  -0.89  -1.31  3.37  5.10 
0/40 0.33  0.39  -0.06  -0.09  -1.48  -2.18  5.63  8.48 
37/0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
37/8.5 0.07  0.05  -0.02 -0.03  -0.52  -0.69  1.99 2.66 
37/18 0.15  0.15  -0.02  -0.03  -0.56  -0.73  2.15 2.83 
37/27 0.26  0.22  -0.03  -0.04  -0.80  -1.05  3.03 4.04 
37/38.5 0.32 0.28 -0.04  -0.05  -1.00  -1.29 3.67  4.99 
37/45 0.36  0.32  -0.04  -0.05  -1.04  -1.40  3.94 5.40 
47/0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
47/8.5 0.06  0.04  -0.02 -0.02  -0.46  -0.59  1.76 2.27 
47/18 0.17  0.13  -0.02  -0.02  -0.50  -0.63  1.90 2.44 
47/27 0.23  0.18  -0.03  -0.04  -0.70  -0.91  2.67 3.50 
47/38.5 0.28 0.24 -0.03  -0.04  -0.86  -1.14 3.29  4.38 
47/45 0.32  0.27  -0.04  -0.05  -0.93  -1.23  3.54 4.76 
* First number refers to working hours of the father, second number to working hours of the mother 
  25